The centrality of Europe is not eternal

by Anas Abdoun In recent years, Europe has seen its economic position evolve. In Africa and the Middle East, other players are gaining ground to its detriment. Energy access has become more complex since 2022. In AI and rare earths, most of the investment and production capacity is today concentrated between the United States and China. Despite this, the continent remains a nodal point for world trade, by the size of its market but above all by its location at the intersection of major maritime, rail and land routes. This centrality results from a long cycle of developments and standards which have structured flows towards Europe. It is now in competition with alternative corridors capable of gradually redirecting trade, without open confrontation.

Global Gateway: the right intuition, the litmus test

China understood before anyone else that we do not shift the balance of power solely through customs tariffs or microprocessors, but through the geography of flows. The New Silk Roads have seeded ports, logistics zones, railway lines and financial capacities capable of gradually rerouting goods, energy and data. India is pushing its own projection, an Indo-Middle East corridor that puts the Gulf at the center, while other regional projects seek to capture a share of this circulation. Ultimately, the consequence is simple: if the roads no longer “naturally” pass through Europe, its centrality income disappears and, with it, a part of its normative power and its wealth. Faced with this shift, the EU reacted by launching Global Gateway. The intuition is correct: propose a credible alternative for financing and building infrastructure (transport, energy, digital) based on contractual transparency, environmental standards and local knock-on effects. On paper, it is a promise of “open” corridors, interoperable and concerned with national sovereignty, the opposite of the logic of dependence. The EU has too often treated Global Gateway as an additional label rather than a political priority. The test is elsewhere: execution. An instrument of influence only exists if it advances at the pace of others. However, the war in Ukraine has mobilized political and budgetary attention, and the EU has too often treated Global Gateway as an additional label rather than as a political priority. While we are still looking for the right financial piping, competitors are delivering terminals, welding rails, closing financing rounds.

South, east, sea

Being at the center is not a state, it is an effort. Europe needs a portfolio of legible corridors, aligned with its vital interests, and supported by assertive economic diplomacy. First in the South: the Mediterranean and North Africa are the natural extension of the European productive apparatus. Carbon-free value chains (cabling, intermediate electronics, batteries, green hydrogen, electrical interconnections) require physical and regulatory “bridges” between shores. The question is not to “compensate” China or India; it is to support European industry with a close, reliable hinterland, both a supplier of clean energy and a competitive assembly base. Then to the East: as long as the Ukrainian theater remains uncertain, logistical continuity towards Central Asia passes through redundant routes (Black Sea, Caucasus, Southern corridor). The goal is not record speed, but optionality: several passable paths are better than a single vulnerable corridor. Finally at sea: the vulnerability of the routes via Suez reminded us that securing the straits, the network of “world-class” European ports and the capacity for rapid rerouting are not technical matters, but matters of sovereignty. The EU must think like a maritime power: fleet, insurance, security, digital standardization of channels.

A vital geoeconomic priority

Global Gateway will not win on a promise of “good governance” alone. It needs financial depth and speed of execution. Concretely, this means: visible tickets (not just guarantees), shortened decision times, European industrial consortia highlighted, and clear articulation between the EU, the EIB/EBRD and national development banks. “Team Europe” must become a geopolitical project owner: a single face, a timetable, a complete package (infrastructure + energy + digital + training), and a requirement for local content which creates allies and not debtors. The geo-economy has once again become a game of corridor empires, and remaining at the center requires building roads, ports, cables and interconnections for which Europe sets the standards with partners who find it in their interest. The EU knows how to finance infrastructure. What she still hesitates to do is prioritize. Global Gateway must be treated as a strategic asset: a protected budget, tight governance, and an explicit political mandate giving it priority over internal disputes. It is not a question of “copying” China: it is a question of assuming that the geo-economy has once again become a game of corridor empires, and that remaining in the center requires building roads, ports, cables and interconnections for which Europe sets the standards with partners who find it in their interest. Europe no longer has the luxury of considering its centrality as an acquired right. In a world where roads are public policies in their own right, Global Gateway is less a program than a test: that of European capacity to translate its market power into projection power. Either the EU makes Gateway a priority, funded, diplomatic, strategic instrument and thus remains the place where roads cross. Either it continues to pile up announcements and discovers, too late, that others have moved the center of gravity and let this last “residual advantage” also become the next area where the Global South will succeed in changing the flow cards.